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Aristotle begins Metaphysics Γ with a bold assertion: there is a science that contemplates being 
qua being and what belongs to it per se (1003a21-22).  The claim is bold because according to the 
requirements that Aristotle sets out for a science in Posterior Analytics and according to a persistent 
strand of argument in Metaphysics B, there ought not to be such a science.  Simply stated, the reason is 
that one science knows one genus, the subject matter of this science, metaphysics, is all beings, but being 
is not is a genus.  That there is a science of metaphysics is a dramatic claim, and metaphysics is the only 
science that investigates its own existence.  The argument for why metaphysics exists is long and detailed.  
Most scholars suppose it has been told many times—so many times that nothing new could possibly 
remain.  I think essential details have been entirely missed and that Aristotle’s argument is generally 
misunderstood, but the text is too complex to do it justice in a brief paper.1  Instead, I focus on a small but 
significant part of the argument here, the generic character of being.   
Why does Aristotle insist that one science knows one genus?  The idea is that a genus is a 
common nature shared by its instances, and it is in respect of this nature that an attribute belongs to these 
instances.  That is to say, the generic nature functions as the middle term in respect of which per se 
attributes belong to instances of the genus.   
Being is not a genus because there is no nature that is common to all beings.  The reason is easy 
to see.  Start with two distinct beings.  If they have a common nature, then they will also share any 
attributes that belong in respect of that nature.  They differ only in respect of their accidents.  But what if 
all these accidents had the same nature?  They would not differ from the initial beings, nor would the 
initial beings differ from each other because all their “accidents” are now the same.  Suppose, then, that 
there is a nature common to all beings.  These beings could only differ from each other by their accidents, 
but their accidents are also beings that differ only in their accidents, and so on.  In short, there is no 
accident that could distinguish one being from another because all accidents are equally beings.  The 
accidents would share the nature common to all beings.  Hence, all would be alike, not only in their 
natures, but in the natures of their accidents.  We could not distinguish between the nature and its 
“accident” because both alike would be beings.  The point here is that if we try to imagine all beings 
having a common nature, we find ourselves unable to say anything else about them than that they are, for 
whatever other character we ascribed to all things would also be a being.   
Suppose, though, that a thing were not only a being, but also something else, say, a color.  We 
might think that a color would differ from something that was, say, a being and a quantity.  But how will 
we distinguish color and quantity from each other and from being?  We need to find two characters that 
are not beings, but clearly this is impossible.  There is nothing that is not a being and, so, nothing that 
could distinguish one being from another. 
Aristotle makes this argument by asking whether being is a genus.  In order to distinguish types 
of being, it would be necessary to differentiate this genus, but the differentia must lie outside the genus 
because an instance of the genus will not be able to distinguish one being from another—the instance 
does not make something else differ in its being.  Of course, we could imagine all beings having a 
common generic character while different beings had different specific characters, as if being were a 
genus that had species.  However, the problem here would be finding a way to distinguish one species of 
                                                
1. For a detailed discussion of this argument as well as the subject of the present paper, see my One and Many in 
Aristotle’s Metaphysics: Books A-Δ (Las Vegas, Nev.: Parmenides Press, 2009).    
Halper Central 09 p. 2 
 
   
being from another.  We need a differentia.  It cannot be in the genus.  It is clear that we could not divide 
being into kinds if all beings were the same: there would be nothing to divide it because there is nothing 
that is not a being.   
All this is to show the difficulty of conceiving of characters that are common to all beings.  This 
is why it is so surprising that Aristotle claims that there is, after all, a science of being.  Since he never 
gives up the idea that one science treats one genus (e.g., Γ.2.1003b19-20), being must be a genus of some 
sort.  Aristotle’s claim that being is pros hen is the essential premise for showing the generic character of 
being.  He reasons: there is a science of a kath’ hen, a pros hen is a kind of kath’ hen; therefore, there is a 
science of a pros hen (1003b11-16).  More specifically: healthy is a pros hen, and there is a science of the 
healthy; hence, it is possible for a science to know a pros hen.  The import of the argument is obscured by 
Aristotle’s speaking of kath’ hen here instead of genus, but there is no doubt that a kath’ hen is a genus.  
The phrase refers to the one character in respect of which each instance of the genus is said.  In the pros 
hen genus, the one character is not common to all the instances, but the character to which all instances 
are related.   
So, being is a genus of some sort, and therefore the object of a science.  The text is 
straightforward, and Aristotle refers to being as a “genus” (1004b22).2  But nearly all readers have spoken 
of being as a pros hen that is beyond the bounds of a genus.3  The question I want to pursue here is 
whether it makes a difference to say that being is a genus.  Or, rather, what I want to show here is that it 
does indeed make a difference.   
Let’s begin with the standard question about the meaning of “being qua being”: does this phrase 
refer to the whole of being or to some proper part of being, namely, ousia?  This chestnut has been so 
thoroughly discussed4 that it seems almost inconceivable that anyone could say anything new—a notion 
that I shall put to rest shortly.  Let us begin by noting that, at first glance, there is strong support for both 
answers.  Since metaphysics is the highest science, the science that knows all beings to the extent 
possible, it must include within its scope all of being.  On the other hand, since metaphysics is the science 
                                                
2. Aristotle cannot be speaking of the genus of ousia in this passage because his point is that sophists treat being 
without discussing ousia.  Another place where “genus” has a broader sense than usual is 1005a1-2’s claim that one 
and many are genera of contraries. 
3. There are other passages where Aristotle uses “genus” to refer to a class that is well beyond a categorial genus.  
At I.4.1055b26-29, as well as at Γ.2, 1004b33-1005a2, for example, he suggests that one and many are the genera of 
the contraries, after having claimed that there is a primary contrariety in each categorial genus. 
4. Those who identify “being qua being” as being include: Auguste Mansion, “L’Objet de la Science 
Philosophique Suprême d’après Aristote, Métaphysique, E, 1,” in Mélanges de Philosophie Greque Offerts à Mgr. 
Diès par ses Élèves, ses Collègues, et se Amis (Paris: J. Vrin, 1956), 156–57; W. D. Ross, ed., Aristotle’s 
Metaphysics (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1958), I, 251; Günther Patzig, “Theology and Ontology in Aristotle’s 
‘Metaphysics’,” in Articles on Aristotle: 3. Metaphysics, ed. Jonathan Barnes, Malcolm Schofield, and Richard 
Sorabji, trans. Jennifer Barnes and Jonathan Barnes (London: Duckworth, 1979), 33–49; Pierre Aubenque, Le 
Problème de l’Être chez Aristote: Essai sur la Problématique Aristotélicienne, Bibliothèque de Philosophie 
Contemporaine (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1983), 35–36; Christopher Kirwan, ed. and trans., 
Aristotle’s Metaphysics: Books Γ, Δ, and E, 2nd ed., Clarendon Aristotle Series (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1993), 77.  On the other side are: Asclepius, In Aristotelis Metaphysicorum Libros A-Z Commentaria, Commentaria 
in Aristotelem Graeca (Berlin: George Reimer, 1888), 225.14–17; Albert Schwegler, trans. and ed., Die Metaphysik 
des Aristoteles: Grundtext, Übersetzung und Commentar, vol. 4 v. in 2 (Frankfurt am Main: Minerva, 1960; rpt. of 
1847–48 ed.), III, 152 ; P. Natorp, “Thema und Disposition der Aristotelischen Metaphysik,” Philosophische 
Monatshefte 24 (1888): 37; Joseph Owens, The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian ‘Metaphysics’: A Study in the 
Greek Background of Mediaeval Thought (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1978), 267; Philip 
Merlan, From Platonism to Neoplatonism (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960), 160–220, esp. 161–62 [also on this 
issue: Philip Merlan, “o!n h|[ o!n und prw&th ou)si/a: Postskript zu einer Besprechung,” Philosophische 
Rundschau 7 (1957): 148–53; and Philip Merlan, “On the Terms ‘Metaphysics’ and ‘Being qua Being’,” Monist 52 
(1968): 174–94]; and Giovanni Reale, The Concept of First Philosophy and the Unity of the Metaphysics of 
Aristotle, trans. John R. Catan (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1980), 144–45. 
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of first principles, and ousia is the first principle, it is clear that metaphysics is principally a science of 
ousia and that it knows other beings through them.  Hence, being qua being should be ousia.  
Recently, it has become popular to say that the phrase “qua being” is adverbial and used mostly 
with a verb for know or study.5  The assumption is that whereas many sciences study the same subject, 
being, only metaphysics studies this subject “qua being.”  It is inferred that the phrase describes how 
metaphysics is to study being and that it, therefore, does not limit the scope of being.   
This is one of those arguments that, despite being repeated frequently, is transparently mistaken.  
In Metaphysics K.4, Aristotle contrasts metaphysics with physics: physics studies being qua motion.  It is 
obvious that not all beings move, and that physics is only concerned with that part of being that does 
move, sensible ousiai.  Likewise, mathematics studies being qua quantity, but this is another way of 
saying that mathematics studies quantity.6  In other words, it is true only “in a way” that metaphysics, 
physics, and mathematics treat the same subject, being, in different ways.  More properly, each treats its 
own proper subject.7  So, it is simply wrong to reason that “qua being” does not restrict the scope of 
being because it is adverbial.  The most we can say is that “qua being” need not restrict the scope of 
being.   
The other side does not fare much better.  The thought here is that being qua being is ousia and 
the science that treats “being qua being and what belongs to it per se” treats ousia and all the other 
categories.  This is consistent with Categories 2 where Aristotle claims that everything else is present in 
or said of ousia.  So by treating ousia and what belongs to it, Aristotle can treat all beings.  However, 
there is an obvious problem here:  the other categories do not belong to ousia per se.  They are often 
called the “accidental categories.”  In fact, Aristotle makes clear what the per se attributes of being qua 
being are at the end of Γ.2:  contrary, complete, one, being,8 same, other, prior, posterior, genus, species, 
whole, and part (1005a11-18).  All these are treated in book Δ; and this book is not a “dictionary,” as it is 
usually called, but a treatment of attributes.  Quality, quantity, and relation also appear in Δ (in chps. 13-
15), but Aristotle includes senses of each of them that extend well beyond the categorial genera they 
usually denote, senses that allow them to be attributes of all beings.9 
There is another problem here.  Aristotle is claiming that everything, ousia and all that belongs to 
it, can be known, somehow, by metaphysics; but the accidents of ousia cannot be know by the science 
that treats it, any more than the accidents of triangles are known by geometry.  It is not enough to include 
accidents in the scope of the science that treats an ousia.10  The task of metaphysics requires not just 
                                                
5. This view was enunciated by Auguste Mansion, “Philosophie Première, Philosophie Seconde et Métaphysique 
chez Aristote,” Revue Philosophique de Louvain 56 (1958): 217.  It has since been endorsed by  Christopher 
Kirwan, Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Books Γ, Δ, and E, Clarendon Aristotle Series (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1971), 77, Jonathan Lear, “Aristotle’s Philosophy of Mathematics,” Philosophical Review 91 (1982): 168–69,  
Jonathan Barnes, Aristotle, Past Masters (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), 25–26, and many others. 
6. At one point, Aristotle says that arithmetic treats man qua indivisible and the geometer treats man qua solid 
(M.3.1078a21-26).  However, his point is that although mathematicals are not separate, mathematicians treat them 
as if they were separate and are justified in doing so.  Hence, to treat man qua solid is to treat a geometric solid.  
Again, the arithmetician and geometer have the same subject, the man, only “in a way”; more properly, each treats 
its own proper subject, discrete or continuous quantity. 
7. De Anima A.1.402a11-22 suggests that each science studies some ousia with a method that is proper to it.  
Numbers and surfaces are examples of such ousiai; that is to say, they are treated by the sciences that study them as 
if they were ousiai. 
8. The inclusion of being in the list of attributes might seem inappropriate especially to those who identify “being 
qua being” as being or a way of treating being.  We can recall that Aristotle includes a thing’s genus among its per 
se attributes (An. Po. A.4.73a34-37). 
9. The discussions of what appear to be categories, namely, quantity, quality, and relative in Δ.13-15 are much 
broader than the comparable chapters of the Categories.  For example, the differentia is one of the things called 
“quality,” and Aristotle’s examples are differentiae of man, horse, and circle (1020a33-b1).  Here, “quality” 
characterizes ousiai and quantity, and it would characterize every being with an essence. 
10. Δ.30.1025a30-34 claims that “accident” can mean essential attribute.  Other categories are not “accidents” of 
ousia in this sense.   
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including all beings in its scope but also being able to know them.  And it is obviously unclear that beings 
can be known: think only of Plato’s denials of such knowledge of what he calls “becoming” and Aristotle 
includes under “being.”  What metaphysics really needs to show is that there can be sciences not only of 
zoology, but of color, music, and the senses. 
In short, being qua being cannot in its initial usage in Γ.1, refer to either ousia or being 
simpliciter.  Fortunately, we have a clue about what it means in the Posterior Analytics.  There Aristotle 
speaks of triangle qua triangle and what belongs to it: he means what belongs to triangles in virtue of their 
essence.  When, accordingly, he mentions being qua being, he must mean what belongs to being in virtue 
of its essence.  It all seems straightforward, but wait: can being have an essence?  This is where we need 
to recall the earlier argument that a pros hen is a kind of kath’ hen.  The latter is the single nature that is 
the essence of a genus.  Being has no such single nature, but ousia is, in a way, common to all beings.  So 
we can say that the essence of being is ousia or, more perspicuously, the essence of being is essence or, 
alternatively, the ousia of being is ousia.   
It would, seem, then, that being qua being is, again, ousia.  But that depends on what ousia 
means, and Aristotle is notoriously elusive about meanings, despite his careful attempts to distinguish 
senses of terms.  A triangle can have an essence, as Aristotle confirms later in the Metaphysics.  That’s 
why it makes sense to talk about the essence or even ousia of a triangle.  The essence of being is the 
same.  It is something that every being has. 
What does all this mean?  To call something a being is not to say anything in particular about it.  
Aristotle’s point is that all beings also have essences: to be is to be something.  Often ascribed to 
Aristotle, this notion is, I am suggesting, the very point Aristotle is making, the crucial claim that allows 
there to be a treatment of all beings that does not reduce to knowledge of a single character.   
Again, my proposal here is that the ousia to which all beings are related is not the categorial 
genus of ousia—not, at least, here in this passage—but simply essence.  And the point is not that all 
beings are or are related to a single essence, but that all beings are related to some essence.  Aristotle’s 
description of the ways that things are related to ousia fits much better with this broad understanding of 
ousia than with the categorial genus of ousia.  Consider what is related to ousia: 
For some are said to be beings because they are ousiai, others because they are affections of 
ousiai, and others because they are ways into ousiai, or corruptions, or privations, or qualities, or 
productive or generative of ousiai or of what is said in relation to ousiai, or else denials of any of 
these or of ousiai.  Therefore, even what is not we say to be what is not (1003b6-10). 
It is an essence or form that, as we know from the Physics (B.1), comes to be in a matter or is corrupted, 
and not just the essence of a nature, but that of a quality or of another category (Phys. Γ.1).  Everything 
mentioned here is related to essence rather than to categorial ousia.  Indeed, only two of the items our 
passage mentions as related to ousiai even could be other categories, the qualities and affections of ousia.  
But both are discussed in book Δ, in chapters 14 and 21, respectively, where Aristotle treats them more 
broadly than categorial genera.  Most of the other relations to ousiai mentioned here are also treated in Δ:  
privations and denials are types of opposites that appear in Δ.10 (also in Δ.22), and he alludes to 
corruptions and generations in this chapter (10.1018a20-22) and to the ways into ousiai in the discussion 
of prior and posterior in the next (11.1018b19-21).  Finally, the false is discussed in Δ.29.  In short, what 
is related to the ousia of any being is discussed in book Δ.  Indeed, reading Γ.2’s description of the ways 
things are related to ousia, a casual reader would never suppose that Aristotle was speaking about other 
categories’ relation to the category of ousia in 1003b5-10.11  His emphasis is the way any ousia comes to 
be and ceases to be.   
                                                
11. Christopher Shields, Order in Multiplicity: Homonymy in the Philosophy of Aristotle, Oxford Aristotle Studies 
(Oxford New York: Clarendon Press, 1999), 217–67, interprets being as a relation of categories (he terms it a “core-
dependent homonym”) and argues at length that Aristotle did not defend this character of being that those he have 
attempted to do so on his behalf have been unsuccessful.  Shields thinks the doctrine false because he understands it 
as asserting degrees of existence.  
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There is another passage here that is consistent with the notion that essence is the character 
common to all beings.  Aristotle famously declares that whatever is is also one because being and one 
make clear the same “nature” (1003b22-25).  The nature that they make clear is the essence that is and is 
one.  This nature is not confined to the categorial genus of ousia; every being has a nature.  This nature is 
its essence.  
On the other hand, because every being has a nature or an essence, it may seem wrong to say 
being is a pros hen, for this would mean that some things are called “beings” because they are ousiai and 
other things because they are merely related to ousiai.  Someone might object:  (1) If every being is an 
ousia, then what comes under the heading of being related to ousia, but not being ousia?  Moreover, (2) 
this account of being is scarcely consistent with Aristotle’s emphasis on the categorial genus of ousia in 
the central books and in book Λ. 
These two objections are easily answered, but there is another objection that I cannot address 
here.  As for (2), in the first chapter of book Z, Aristotle emphasizes the dependence of the other 
categories on ousia.  Categorial ousia is prior in formula, knowledge, and time.  In particular, the formula 
of ousia is present in the formulae of each of the other categories.  So the essences of other categories 
depend on the essence of ousia.  Thus, ousia does stand in some sort of pros hen relation with other 
categories.  The issue for us is not the truth of the standard interpretation, but whether it is what Aristotle 
is claiming in Γ.2.  The striking difference in the way this latter chapter expresses the priority of ousia 
suggests it is not making the same point as Z.1.  Moreover, Z.1 is casually assuming the point I think Γ.2 
is making: that each being has an essence.  The other objection (1) was: if being qua being is the essence 
that each being has, how could there be beings related to ousia and how could there be per se attributes of 
beings?  I think that Aristotle is answering this question when he describes what is related to beings as a 
path into ousia, a destruction of ousia, and a privation of ousia.  All these are defined through the essence.  
They are in some very broad sense negations of essence.  The point is that what has an essence is a being, 
but that its having an essence requires some process of acquisition and, ultimately, a process of loss, 
neither of which is identical with essence and both of which are understood in terms of the essence.  
(Indeed, something’s having an essence becomes meaningful because it must acquire and lose that 
essence.)  A negation of essence is itself an essence and thus counts as a being.  Hence, what belongs to 
being per se is not something that is other than being—there is nothing besides being.  What belongs to 
being per se is rather what depends on essence.  We could gather this from Aristotle’s examples of per se 
attributes of being: same, contrariety, being, one, and so forth.  These characters do not belong 
exclusively to one genus.  They do not fall under one category because they do not have a particular 
categorial nature of their own.  Yet, all of them depend on essences.  They are, I think, the reason that 
Aristotle adds that even what is not also, in some way, is; for to the extent that they negate essences, they 
are not; but in negating essence, they are defined through it, and therefore are. 
It is evident that the doctrine of being I am ascribing to Aristotle is not easy.  In contrast, the 
notions that being qua being is simply being and, alternatively, that it is categorial ousia are both 
relatively simple.  It would be better if I could argue for my interpretation through its simplicity.  
Moreover, although there is scarcely any text in Aristotle’s corpus that has been discussed more than the 
opening of Metaphysics Γ, I am proposing an interpretation that has not been seriously considered in the 
extant literature.  Hence, I find myself in the uncomfortable position of trying to convince you that the 
proper understanding of being qua being is more difficult and complex than what you have learned 
elsewhere.  In a way, my task here is impossible because, if I am right, then being is just barely 
intelligible.   
I suggest that this last criticism really counts in my favor.  It has generally been assumed that 
Aristotle’s account of being will be transparently intelligible.  But why should it be?  Being is at the 
lowest rung of reality—it is just barely the object of science and, as such, it should be barely intelligible.  
My understanding of being qua being makes clear the limited intelligibility of being and allows for the 
possibility of attributes of the sort Aristotle describes in Γ.2 and book Δ.  Being is the object of a science 
that seeks to know that it has an essence, and the essence that being has enables it to be known.  Only this 
is an essence that is not a real essence, but something that is more like a similarity or analogy.  The type 
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of intelligibility I am ascribing to being is not adequate, but for this very reason, when we try to grasp it 
more carefully, we are led to higher causes. 
Aristotle treats being as some sort of genus, I have been arguing.  What is the advantage of 
calling it a genus?  On the two alternative views, being is not a genus.  Because a pros hen extends 
beyond a genus, and because the only thing that Aristotle describes beyond the genus is analogy, it is 
plausible to assume that being is some sort of analogy.  This is Thomas Aquinas’ move.  Aristotle talks 
about analogy as a similarity in relation; it requires four terms (Δ.6.1016b34-35).  Aquinas invents 
another kind of analogy that he ascribes to Aristotle.  Instead of a similarity in relation, it consists of a 
similarity of term; thus, when two things are related to one term, even though the relation be dissimilar, 
they are analogous.  This relation between three terms has come to be called the “analogy of attribution.”   
Aquinas is concerned with privations because he assumes that being is a positive character, an 
act.  In my view, the real challenge for Aristotle is not a privation like blindness but a denial like not-
sighted.  Blindness is an attribute of animals that is known through its genus; not-sighted includes not 
only what could have sight but plants, rocks, chairs, sweet, and loud—all of which are beings in other 
genera.  Not-sighted belongs to every being that is not in some genus; because it spans beings in different 
categorial genera, there would seem to be no possibility of knowing not-sighted.  (Recall that one science 
[=one knowledge] knows one genus.)  But if we cannot grasp not-sighted, then we also cannot know the 
principle of non-contradiction, the claim that the same thing cannot be sighted and not-sighted in the same 
way, at the same time, etc.  Or, rather, the PNC would need to belong to the order of knowing and have 
no real ontic import.  It is here that it becomes important that being is a genus.  As Aristotle says, even 
what is not is a being (1003b10).12  He goes on to explain that denials are like privations: both are said in 
respect of something one; either this something is absent simply or it is absent to a genus (1004a13-16).  
The point is that the one science that knows the something must also know both its privation and its 
denial (1004a10-12).  Again, this is possible because the denial is also a way of knowing what is denied.  
We know the denial as a being from which a particular essence is absent—just as we know blindness as a 
state of a genus or as an individual in a genus who, by nature, should be capable of seeing.  Hence, the 
denial of some nature is the state of generic being that is not that nature.  The denial can be known 
because it is a determination of being.  Insofar as knowing the PNC depends on knowing denials, the 
PNC can only be grasped by a science that can treat being as a genus. 
I am referring here to very difficult discussions that Aristotle includes in Metaphysics Γ.2 in 
conjunction with the pros hen doctrine of being, discussions that are rarely considered.  They support 
very nicely the picture I am painting of being as a genus.  Aristotle’s being is a kind of super-genus that is 
further determined into by the categorial genera and their species.  This genus has as its essential nature 
just “to have an essence,” precisely the character that is further determined by the specific characters that 
constitute categorial genera.  To be sure, “having an essence” is not a real character that is common to all 
beings.  But it serves as the basis of all science and all further determination of essence.   
  If being is a genus whose generic character is the essence of each being, then the first question is 
not how secondary beings are related to primary beings but how there could be secondary beings at all, 
for all beings have their own essences.  The answer is simple: the secondary beings are various sorts of 
negations of the primary beings.  What, after all, is a path into or out of being other than an essence not 
fully realized and, thus, in some respect negated.  As long as being constitutes some sort of generic 
character, the negation of any essence will also belong to the genus.  And just as the negation of white in 
the genus of color is another color, black, so too the negation of some being should always be another 
instance of the genus of being.  Now, as a being, black or any other privation, has an essence, and its 
essence includes its relation to white or that of which it is the privation.  So, too, the denial, not-white, 
also has some sort of essence.  The relation of a privation to the essence is essential to what it is, but 
many denials belong accidentally: it is essential to black not to be white, but accidental to a table or a 
rock.  So, too, of things related to some primary being, some must be understood through it, and others 
                                                
12. It is significant here that Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle, trans. John Patrick 
Rowan (Chicago: H. Regnery Co., 1961), IV. L.1:C 539–40, claims that negation exists only in the mind.  
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can be understood independently of it—or, as the medievals might have put it, beings are not related to 
primary being exclusively “intrinsically” or exclusively “extrinsically.”  Primary being here is not a single 
real nature, but merely the essence of whatever has an essence.  If this is right, to be related to primary 
being is not to be related to a nature with a single essence.  As a result, there is no danger that all being 
would be a strict kath’ hen genus through their relation with primary beings, nor that their relationship 
with primary being be merely the superficial extrinsic relations.   
It is because all beings have essences that all of them can be known in a single science.  Just what 
does that science know?  In Metaphysics Γ, it does not know very much.  It knows that beings can be 
known.  That is important because among being are quantities and colors, objects of the sciences of 
mathematics and color: we need to know that these latter sciences have objects that can be known.  In 
knowing that beings can be known, metaphysics provides the basis for the particular sciences.  For every 
science has as its subject matter an ousia or, as in the case mathematicals, what can be treated as an ousia.  
Metaphysics shows that these particular sciences are legitimate.  Second, it shows that beings have 
essential attributes.  These attributes include one, difference, contrariety, and the other terms that give us a 
handle on the generic structure and, thereby, explain the possibility of there being definitions of essences.  
Third, metaphysics knows the principle of non-contradiction.  This is the principle of all knowledge and it 
depends on and, I have argued, is virtually equivalent to each being’s having an essence and ousia.  None 
of this counts as complete knowledge of being, but it is important. 
The interpretation of being qua being that I have offered here is well-supported by Metaphysics 
Γ, but the real issue is not whether Aristotle said it, but whether it is right.  Do things have to have 
essences?  It is worth recalling that, in the Parmenidean world that is probably Aristotle’s target here, 
there are no individual essences and all is one because no being differs from any other.  This is the 
problem I opened with: if all beings are alike, we could never be in a position to say what their similarity 
is, nor consequently could we ever have knowledge of them.  Knowledge requires differentiations.  We 
need a more refined way to grasp things, and beings must exist with characters more finely delimited than 
simple being: they must exist with essences.  Whether these characters are plants and animals, matter and 
soul, or the atomic elements and particles is a separate question. 
There remains, however, one central difficulty with my analysis here.  As I understand it, being 
qua being is not a real character, but the essence that each being has, and these essences are many.  If this 
is right, then being would seem closer to proportionate analogy; so that in arguing against an analogy of 
attribution, I will end up with something still more problematic.  This problem deserves more attention 
than I can give it here.  Let me simply note that Aristotle does discuss a proportionate analogy at some 
length in conjunction with his discussion of one, and we can learn a lot about being by seeing how it 
differs from one.  Aristotle describes the one as a qualitative or quantitative measure in each genus; so it 
is clear that one differs in each genus and that the term “one” refers collectively to particular ones (I.2).  
He claims that “the essence of one” (to\ e9ni\ ei]nai) is either some thing that is one, that is, an individual 
or a motion, or it is something “closer to a word,” just as “element” could refer to, say, a thing like fire, or 
more generally to being a constituent (I.1052b5-9).  There is nothing in common among all ones.  Being 
is not like this.  The essence of being, that is, being qua being, is simply essence, I have been arguing, and 
that is important because it allows being to have the character of a quasi-genus and, thereby, to be treated 
by one science; that is to say, it allows metaphysics to exist.  But every essence contains some reference 
to the categorial genus of ousia.  So, any more precise knowledge of essence makes clear the priority of 
categorial ousia, and ultimately sensible ousiai’s dependence on immaterial ousiai.  The issue here is not 
where the Metaphysics ends up, nor is it the dependence of beings on categorial ousiai.  The issue is, 
rather, what, in the first instance it means to be, and the answer is that it means to be something, that is, to 






Halper Central 09 p. 8 
 
   
Bibliography 
Asclepius. In Aristotelis Metaphysicorum Libros A-Z Commentaria. Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca. 
Berlin: George Reimer, 1888. 
Aubenque, Pierre. Le Problème de l’Être chez Aristote: Essai sur la Problématique Aristotélicienne. 
Bibliothèque de Philosophie Contemporaine. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1983. 
Barnes, Jonathan. Aristotle. Past Masters. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982. 
Halper, Edward.  One and Many in Aristotle's Metaphysics: Books A-Δ. Las Vegas, Nev.: Parmenides 
Press, 2009. 
Kirwan, Christopher, ed. and trans. Aristotle’s Metaphysics: Books Γ, Δ, and E. 2nd ed. Clarendon 
Aristotle Series. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993. 
Lear, Jonathan. “Aristotle’s Philosophy of Mathematics.” Philosophical Review 91 (1982): 162–91. 
Mansion, Auguste. “L’Objet de la Science Philosophique Suprême d’après Aristote, Métaphysique, E, 1.” 
In Mélanges de Philosophie Greque Offerts à Mgr. Diès par ses Élèves, ses Collègues, et se Amis. 
Paris: J. Vrin, 1956. 
------. “Philosophie Première, Philosophie Seconde et Métaphysique chez Aristote.” Revue Philosophique 
de Louvain 56 (1958): 165–221. 
Merlan, Philip. From Platonism to Neoplatonism. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960. 
------. “On the Terms ‘Metaphysics’ and ‘Being qua Being’.” Monist 52 (1968): 174–94. 
------. “o!n h[ o!n und prw&th ou)si/a: Postskript zu einer Besprechung.” Philosophische Rundschau 7 
(1957): 148–53. 
Natorp, P. “Thema und Disposition der Aristotelischen Metaphysik.” Philosophische Monatshefte 24 
(1888): 37–65, 540–74. 
Owens, Joseph. The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian ‘Metaphysics’: A Study in the Greek 
Background of Mediaeval Thought. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1978. 
Patzig, Günther. “Theology and Ontology in Aristotle’s ‘Metaphysics’.” In Articles on Aristotle: 3. 
Metaphysics, edited by Jonathan Barnes, Malcolm Schofield, and Richard Sorabji, translated by 
Jennifer Barnes and Jonathan Barnes, 33–49. London: Duckworth, 1979. 
Reale, Giovanni. The Concept of First Philosophy and the Unity of the Metaphysics of Aristotle. 
Translated by John R. Catan. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1980. 
Ross, W. D., ed. Aristotle’s Metaphysics. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1958. 
Schwegler, Albert, trans. and ed. Die Metaphysik des Aristoteles: Grundtext, Übersetzung und 
Commentar. Vol. 4 v. in 2. Frankfurt am Main: Minerva, 1960; rpt. of 1847–48 ed. 
Shields, Christopher. Order in Multiplicity: Homonymy in the Philosophy of Aristotle. Oxford Aristotle 
Studies. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999. 
Thomas Aquinas. Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle. Translated by John Patrick Rowan. 
Chicago: H. Regnery Co., 1961. 
 
 
 
 
